



# **NS News Bulletin**

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## **Hitler at War : What *Really* Happened ?**

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**Part 6**

### **Chapter 5: Czech and Polish Powder Kegs**

***“Four hostile newspapers are more to be feared than a thousand bayonets.”***

**Napoleon Bonaparte**

The Treaty of Versailles that ended World War One is commonly cited by historians as fundamentally responsible for the next global conflict. Signed under duress by faint-hearted German politicians, it was nothing less than the legalized plunder of a defeated people. Naturally, the victorious Allies regarded their motives for having gone to war as purely defensive, so the prostrate enemy was alone guilty of provoking hostilities. Never mentioned in the halls of Versailles were the *revanche* politics that had dominated France since her humiliation at Sedan in 1871; England's traditional policy of warring against the Continent's leading power, regardless who it may be, to ensure her own predominance; and Russia's desire

to unite Slavdom under the Czar by appearing as its savior in Serbia. Germany's only pre-war "crime" had been to become an industrial competitor. It was her new-found wealth that motivated the corporate treaty-makers of 1918, when they stole Germany's coal-fields, leaving her people to freeze and starve, and imposed reparations on them so severe they were condemned to perpetual impoverishment. Hence, the economic necessity of making the Germans solely responsible for the "Great War".

The Versailles Treaty was nothing more than a formal document drawn up to cover the looting of a vanquished foe. The international criminals who engineered it compounded their villainy by hobbling together a European Continent fragmented through war and revolution from broken-off remnants of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and Imperial Germany. In their greed, revenge and ignorance, the treaty-makers parceled out whole regions of unrelated, often antithetical peoples to new, artificially created states. Millions of Poles, Germans and Hungarians suddenly found themselves in Czechoslovakia; more Germans in Poland and Lithuania, with additional thousands of Poles in Hungary, Hungarians in Rumania, etc., etc. In the Sudetenland alone, 2,800,000 ethnic Germans had been stranded behind the Czech border, cut off from their homeland, and under the authority of an openly hostile, foreign government. Some 625 square miles of Polish territory occupied by more than a quarter of a million Poles were handed over to Czechoslovakia. Hungary lost 7,500 square miles of territory with 775,000 of its people, likewise without their consent.

By way of comparison, had the United States lost a war, and been forced to cede, say, Washington, Montana or Idaho, with its American populations, to Canada, or California, Texas and Arizona to Mexico, our country would have found itself in a condition analogous to that Germany, Poland and Hungary confronted after the First World War. And whenever the resident Germans, Poles, or Hungarians objected to the often brutal conditions imposed on them, their protests were "ruthlessly crushed by the Prague Government of President Benes" (Chant, 5). As General Leon DeGrelle observed, it was inevitable that such a mess would eventually explode into a new international conflict, with or without Hitler.

Beginning in 1933, Germans in territories cut off from the Reich, where the Fuehrer had restored national pride, yearned to re-join their homeland. In Sudetenland, the German minority voted more than 90% to return to the Reich in a plebiscite monitored by international observers. When, during May, 1938, the Czech government still refused to let Sudetenlanders go back to their own country, then mobilized its armed forces, Hitler threatened to call out the Wehrmacht. By then, he was aware of the Allies' determination to wage war against him, one way or another, despite all his efforts at international understanding. Germany was not actu-

ally ready for combat, but neither were France or England---yet. At their rate of rearmament, however, they would pose an overwhelming military threat in just a few more years. For example, the RAF spent more on rearmament than all of the German armed forces combined during the 1930's. The Reich could only hope to successfully defend itself against the Allies before they became too strong to resist. Consequently, the Fuehrer informed his commanders that if the Sudetenland Question was not solved by 1 October, they were to commence armed operations against Czechoslovakia.

With Europe balanced on the bayonet point of war, only a man with the personal authority and diplomatic skill of Benito Mussolini could save the peace. He summoned a last-minute, emergency, four-power meeting in Munich. Fluent in English, French and German, he made all the delegates understand that reuniting the Sudetenlanders with their natural homeland was the only way to avoid hostilities, despite ceaseless agitation in the international press. Meanwhile, Edward Benes, the well-publicized leader of Czechoslovakia, was depicted around the world in the press, newsreels, and radio programs as the noble, pitiable victim of Fascist rapacity and Allied intimidation. "At the same time," observed historian Peter Gryner from the perspective of seventy years, "Dr. Benes, the politically and morally weak Czech president, who had no stomach for war, resigned and fled to France with \$10,000 [Soviet donated] in his pocket" (48).

Just two days before the Wehrmacht was to invade Czechoslovakia, the Munich Pact was signed. The Duce, having saved Europe from suicide, returned to a well-deserved hero's triumph in Rome, and the Sudetenlanders went back to their Reich without incident. Churchill meanwhile, referring to himself and his fellow warmongers in the "Focus", grouched, "We have sustained a total and unmitigated defeat" (Innes, 13).

But the humiliated Czech politicians vented their frustrations on other foreign peoples still left under their control by the Versailles Treaty. The Slovaks and Hungarian Ruthenians suffered bitter oppression, and appealed to Adolf Hitler for the same kind of help he had given the Sudetenlanders. When he further learned from his SD that the Czechs were secretly building air-bases for Soviet bombers capable of striking German targets within 30 minutes after take-off, he seized Czechoslovakia, dividing it into Bohemia and Moravia, names by which these countries had been known for centuries before the Versailles Treaty. One glance at a post-World War One map shows how this synthetic state pushed deep into German territory like a dagger thrust to keep Germany perpetually crippled.

"Czechoslovakia" was an artificial creation of French and British politicians who knew nothing of the region they presumed to reconstitute. In fact, their real objective in fashioning Czechoslovakia out of whole cloth was to keep Central Eu-

rope in constant turmoil (i.e., impotence). Hitler immediately dismantled this subversive contrivance, and rebuilt it along natural lines; in other words, ethnically, linguistically and culturally related populations were allowed to form their own communities. He gave the Slovaks their freedom under the Catholic Monsignor, Josef Tiso, and allowed Hungary to reunite with its separated countrymen in Ruthenia. In describing the Czech crisis, mainstream historians almost invariably fail to credit Hitler for the freedom he gave these non-German minorities, including Poles in Teschen, who were likewise permitted to return to their homeland. The settlement he and Mussolini brokered “gave Poland the common frontier with Hungary which she had wanted for years” (Innes, 35). In April of this same year, Polish pilots marched in triumph beside Luftwaffe airmen through Madrid at the victorious conclusion of the Spanish Civil War. Tragically, just five months later, they would be flying against each other.

Hitler’s early diplomatic triumph had been a non-aggression pact with Poland in 1934, followed over the next several years by secret proposals for a military alliance to protect Europe against the Soviets. In January, Reichsminister Dr. Joseph Goebbels made a personable and very favorable impression on Warsaw government leaders, and the two countries drew noticeable closer together. As Watt observed, “The visit was a success”(325). Next year, Marshall Pilsudski welcomed Hermann Goering, who proposed a military alliance against Russia. After that country’s defeat, Poland would be awarded the entire Ukraine. Such a German-Polish union would have created a joint force too powerful for either the Western Allies or the USSR to tackle, while foiling the schemes of Churchill and his war-mongering ilk.

Goering’s proposal was one of the great turning-points of modern history. Had it been accepted, the course of events would have been dramatically altered, and the Communist colossus overthrown. Moreover, the Soviet Union was at this time in political and military disarray, what with Stalin’s paranoid purges of high-ranking officials in the armed forces and politburo. A late-1930’s invasion of the USSR by German and Polish forces would have stood a far better chance of succeeding than Operation *Barbarossa* did in 1941. By then, the Red Army was itself ready to attack Germany. Had Pilsudski accepted Goering’s generous offer, Poland could have emerged as a truly significant European power, and avoided her terrible fate to come. Instead, the Marshall continued to indulge himself in the dangerous game of playing the Germans off against the Russians, pretending his country was already the power-broker of Europe, ignoring her precarious position between the Third Reich and the Soviet Union. Instead of reasonably siding with one state against the other, he chose to manipulate both, and his country was crushed between them.

Even so, Hitler continued to express sincere admiration for both Pilsudski and modernized Poland, declaring in May, 1935 before the Reichstag, "We recognize with the understanding and the heartfelt friendship of true nationalists, the Polish state as the home of a great, nationally conscious people." The following month, German and Polish representatives initiated talks that led six months later to a trade agreement. As Watt pointed out, "This treaty was extremely important to Poland inasmuch as Germany was by far Poland's most important export market. In the past, Germany had been able to work considerable havoc on the Polish economy by implementing arbitrary changes in tariffs or quotas on imports from Poland. This new agreement gave Poland most-favored-nation status, and cleared up a number of economic disputes between the two nations" (327).

These exemplary relations, together with the growing menace of Soviet Russia, gradually began winning over the Poles to reconsideration of Goering's proposed military alliance. As an indication of its pro-Reich intentions, the Warsaw government dispatched Polish aircraft to fly with his *Condor Legion*, in Spain. Only eight months before the outbreak of war, Hitler sincerely told Josef Beck during the Polish Foreign Minister's 5 January 1939 visit to Berchtesgaden, "Germany would be greatly interested in the continued existence of a strongly nationalist Polish state, because of what might happen in Russia ... Quite apart from that, the existence of a strong Polish Army lightened Germany's load to a considerable degree. The divisions which Poland kept on her frontier with Russia spared Germany from a similar military burden" (Innes, 31).

Meanwhile, the international instigators---deeply frustrated by Mussolini's victory for peace in Czechoslovakia---looked around for another trouble spot to reignite hostilities. They found it at Danzig. Like Sudetenland, the Medieval city had been cut off from its German parent by the hateful bunglers at Versailles twenty years before. Its marooned citizens likewise clamored for reunification with their homeland, now that it was a proud National Socialist state. But they were connected by the impossibly contrived device of a slender corridor to the east Prussian frontier. Some one-and-a-half million Germans had been stranded in Poland by the Versailles Treaty.

To amicably solve the dilemma, Hitler offered to finance the construction of a highway and railroad connecting Danzig. In exchange for greater access to the old German city, these constructions were to be taxed by the Poles, who would also operate their own railway to Danzig, where all their economic rights were to be protected and preserved. Poland stood to make a handsome, on-going profit without compromising her territorial sovereignty. "At this moment," he declared on the sixth anniversary of the National Socialist Seizure of Power, "there are almost no differences of opinion between our friendly, peaceful states about the im-

portance of this instrument (the German-Polish Non-Aggression Pact of 1934) ... Last year, we saw the friendship between Germany and Poland prove its worth as a guarantee of peace in the political life of Europe” (Innes, 33); i.e., Poland’s contribution to settlement of the Czech Crisis.

Negotiations concerning Danzig proceeded cordially, without urgency, beginning in October, 1938, and Hitler was confident of their mutually satisfactory outcome. He was unpleasantly surprised, however, when Josef Beck coldly turned down his invitation to join the Anti-Comintern Pact just eleven days after Berchtesgaden, where both governments were drifting toward such an alliance. Backed up by the combined military might of the Third Reich, Fascist Italy and Imperial Japan, Poland would have been spared any further anxieties concerning Soviet ambitions on her Russian frontier. When the German Foreign Ambassador visited Warsaw to celebrate the fifth anniversary of the German-Polish Non-Aggression Pact, the Poles refused all mention of Danzig, and greeted the German delegation with cold formality.

In March, the Warsaw government terminated all further discussion of Danzig with flat rejection of the Fuehrer’s generous proposals, by which the Poles stood to gain so much economically and especially militarily. He laid the situation on the line to them through his Ambassador: “the German-Polish agreement could not survive without Poland showing ‘a clear, anti-Soviet attitude. Poland must understand that she has to choose between Germany and Russia’” (Innes, 35). That same month, the previously friendly Beck told his diplomatic colleague, Count Szembek, “we know the exact limit of our own interests ... beyond that limit, Poland can only announce a *non possum* (“we cannot”; plea of inability; refusal). It is very simple: We shall fight!” Beck’s resolve would have come as a shock to Hitler, who still counted on Poland as a vital ally against Soviet Communism, and he could not have guessed that the abrupt shift in Polish attitude had been engineered by a foreign diplomat.

William C. Bullitt, President Roosevelt’s confidential operative in Europe, was a high-ranking government official as far back as the Wilson administration during 1919, when he advocated U.S. recognition of the Soviet Union. His recommendation was universally spurned by Congress, after congressional investigations revealed the USSR was nothing more than a bloody tyranny imposed on the Russian people by international Jew gangsters. Dispirited by such a verdict, he dropped out of politics, but was reinstated by F.D.R. as America’s first ambassador to the Soviets after recognition of the USSR, Roosevelt’s first international action upon assuming the presidency. Bullitt’s high-level pro-Communism and intolerance of Fascism qualified him as one of the Jews’ most valuable tools for dismantling normal relations between Gentile nations.

Traveling through eastern Europe, he used his natural diplomatic skills and impressive credentials as the President's personal representative to over-awe Polish officials. Bullitt urged them to force down the Germans on Danzig. War must inevitably come, but by then Britain and France would invade the Reich from the west, with the Fuehrer caught in the middle. Poland was to get the rest of eastern Germany in her part of the deal. All the Poles had to do was provoke Hitler to attack, then hold him off just long enough for the British and French to come to their rescue. Blinded to this transparent deception by greed and arrogance, Warsaw's naive leaders gambled their country's existence on the assurances of foreign politicians to whom Poland was nothing more than an expedience for the war they were determined to foment somewhere, somehow.

Having sown the seeds of conflict in Poland, Bullitt slithered on to France, where he similarly assured French officials that the U.S. would back up any war they waged against Germany. Inside a year, with his country being pummeled into submission by the Wehrmacht, the Premiere of France, Eduard Deladier, broadcast his famous appeal to America, asking for the "clouds of warplanes" promised by Bullitt. A week later, the Germans entered Paris.

Bullitt proceeded to London, where he met with the British Prime Minister. In 1941, shortly before his death from cancer, and in the midst of Europe's Second Fratricidal War, Neville Chamberlain confessed that "England would have never gone to war over Poland without the constant urging of Bullitt and the Jews" (Forrestal, 178). Chamberlain was no friend of the Reich, but he sincerely wanted to avoid war, at least for the present, stalling for time until Britain's armed forces were sufficiently built up to challenge the Wehrmacht. He had been deceived by Ian Colvin, a virulently anti-German journalist at the *News Chronicle*. Colvin was responsible for single-handedly changing British Polish policy by lying to the Prime Minister on 29 March that the Fuehrer was set to attack Poland at the earliest available opportunity with a prearranged plan. "However, the contingency plan (Hitler's *Case White*) was now activated as a *result* of the British guarantee" to fight for Poland (Irving, *Goebbels*, f.293). By way of this deception, Colvin "tilted the balance to war".

The Western "democracies" had made it clear to Hitler that they were determined to make war on him, but he hoped it still might be postponed as long as possible. Even so, if hostilities must come, he preferred them on his own terms, when Germany stood the best chance of success. With Allied rearmament going ahead at full speed, time was working against him. For example, in 1939, the year the war began, the French government was out-spending Germany on armaments, while its large air force was more heavily funded than Hermann Goering's Luftwaffe. Beginning in February, 1934, according to U.S. journalist, Douglas Brin-

kley, Paris was spending a billion francs annually for its air force alone (68). Five years later, it fielded more than 3,000 aircraft, somewhat less than the Luftwaffe, but combined with the Polish, Dutch and British air forces, the Germans would be out-numbered in the air by at least three-to-one odds. Altogether, army reserves in Poland, the Netherlands, France and Britain totaled some ten million men, outnumbering German reserves by five to one. At sea, the Allies had twenty times the warships possessed by the Kriegsmarine.

Acutely aware of the looming threat posed to the existence of his country by the furiously arming Allies, Hitler continued to offer equitable settlements to the Poles. Their obstinacy had by now become insufferable, even to the British and French (who were having second thoughts about Bullitt's unofficial promises of U.S. military aid), as late as 27 and 29 August---literally days before the outbreak of war. They urged Warsaw to negotiate with Hitler, but the Poles adamantly refused, trusting Bullitt's confidential assurances. That same month, when the French ambassador suggested they allow Soviet armed forces on their soil to defend Poland, Marshal Edward Rydz-Smigly, the Polish Commander-in-Chief, replied, "With the Germans, we would risk losing our liberty. With the Russians we would lose our soul" (Innes, 60). For yielding to Bullitt's siren-song, they would lose both.

A few days later, the Fuehrer sought to head off a crisis by requesting the resumption of direct talks with the Polish foreign minister. He told the British Ambassador, Sir Neville Henderson, "In these circumstances, the German Government agrees to accept the British Government's offer of their good services in securing the dispatch to Berlin of a Polish emissary with full powers. They count on the arrival of this emissary on Wednesday, 30 August" (Innes, 82). Instead, Beck kept the Germans waiting for two, whole days without giving them an answer, then flew to London, where he and his diplomatic colleague, Count Edward Raczynski, signed a Mutual Assistance Pact with the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Halifax. The agreement guaranteed England's armed intervention if Poland were attacked "by any foreign foe", although Germany alone was cited in a secret protocol not disclosed until after the war.

Only by reading next day in the newspapers about Beck's high-handed contempt for negotiations of any kind did the Fuehrer learn what had happened. This unprecedented rebuff of a neighbor-country's elected leader in the midst of appealing for peace was a deliberate provocation followed immediately by Polish mobilization and military maneuvers near the German border---all meant to bate Hitler into attacking. He recalled six years later, in his last will and testament, "As late as three days before the outbreak of the German-Polish War, I proposed to the British ambassador in Berlin a solution for the German-Polish problem similar to the



problem of the Saar area, under international control. This offer cannot be explained away. It was only rejected because the responsible circles in English politics wanted the war, partly in the expectation of business advantages, partly driven by propaganda promoted by International Jewry.”

As early as the previous January, when the Poles’ mood first soured against Germany, Ribbentrop confided to his diplomatic colleagues during their return to Berlin, “From now on, we have only one choice of action if we want to escape from territorial encirclement, and that is to get an understanding with the Russians” (Innes, 33). For his part, Hitler would not allow himself to be surrounded by enemies. He needed to out-flank them diplomatically before the shooting started. As he told Jacob Burckhardt, the Danzig League of Nations Swiss commissioner, “Everything I undertake is directed against the Soviet Union. If the West is too stupid and blind to grasp this, I shall be compelled to come to an agreement with the Russians.” Accordingly, on 23 August he shocked the world (including his own NSDAP comrades, some of whom resigned in protest) by concluding a non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union. It was a drastic move forced on him by the Western democracies that compelled him to prevent the development of a second front through normalizing relations with Russia.

He explained in a Reichstag speech nearly two years later, while his legions were rolling into the USSR, “It was therefore only with extreme difficulty that I brought myself in August, 1939 to send my foreign minister to Moscow in an endeavor there to oppose the British encirclement policy against Germany.” By doing so, he beat France and England at their own game of high-stakes diplomacy. Both had eagerly courted Stalin for an alliance against the Third Reich, but the Marshall preferred a momentary treaty with Germany that would allow him vital time for the completion of his own rearmament.

In the words of Red Army Marshall Stephanis, “The pact between the Soviet Union and Hitler’s Germany is only temporary. We will not let it last very long”. He was seconded by Marshall Vorsolov, who said, “The Germans must not have any inkling that we are preparing to stab them in the back while they are busy fighting the French, otherwise they could change their general plan, and attack us”. None of this would have surprised Hitler, who wrote as early as the composition of *Mein Kampf* in 1925, “The present rulers of Russia have no idea of honorably entering into an alliance, let alone observing one” (Vol. Two, Chapter XIV). He rightly concluded, “Germany is today the next great war aim of Bolshevism.”

When war with the Soviet Union began, “Hitler seems to have barely beaten Stalin to the punch,” according to Russell H.S. Stolfi, Professor of History at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, in Monterey, California. “Recently published evidence and particularly effective arguments show that Stalin began a massive de-

ployment of Soviet forces to the western frontier early in June, 1941. The evidence supports a view that Stalin intended to use the forces concentrated in the west as quickly as possible, probably about mid-July, 1941, for a Soviet *Barbarossa*. Statements of prisoners also support a view that the Soviets intended an attack on Germany in 1941. The extraordinary deployment of the Soviet forces on the western frontier is best explained as an offensive deployment for an attack with full mobilization by extremely powerful forces massed there for that purpose” (Michaels, 21).

Horst Slesina, a veteran of Operation *Barbarossa*’s first days, personally witnessed Soviet preparations for the invasion of Europe. “For the first time,” he recalled the earliest days of the campaign, “we learn the details of the horrific threat against our Fatherland and all of Europe posed by the advance of the Soviet Army. We see from the diplomatic and military game of the Soviet Union---and the shameless demands of Stalin and Molotov---that the bosses in the Kremlin believe their hour has come. The negotiations with England, the advance of Soviet forces to the borders of Germany, Finland, Hungary and Rumania eliminate last doubts about Soviet intentions. Bolshevism is ready to start the march for world revolution with an attack against Germany ... When the first (German) infantrymen came to the East, were unloaded and advanced to the border a while back, we saw gigantic columns of Russians coming up, who built their positions ever closer to the German border ... They created a thick network at the German border behind which gigantic, endless columns executed one of the most massive mobilizations in the history of warfare” (8-11).

After the war, Major Koskov, Red Army Commander of the 24th Infantry Regiment, the 44th Infantry Division, admitted that “the Russians would have attacked Germany of their own accord in two or three weeks at the latest” (Johnson, 36). While the Reich and Russia were still at peace, Stalin boasted to graduates of the Frunze Military Academy on 5 May 1941, “We can begin the war with Germany within the next two months. Now that we are strong, we must go from defense to attack.” In the words of U.S. Department of Defense Russian translator, Daniel Michaels, “Russian analysts estimate that the Germans launched their preemptive strike two or four weeks before the Soviets’ planned move” (20).

But for now, Hitler needed an arrangement, however impermanent, with the USSR to avoid a two-front war; to keep the Russian bear at arms’ length, if only temporarily. He also aimed at trapping the Western Allies in their own treaty with Warsaw, concluded on 25 August. It specified that Britain and France would declare war on “anyone” who invaded Poland; although Germany was obviously intended as the potential invader, she was not mentioned by name, at least publicly. If Germany and Russia invaded Poland, the Allies were obliged by their own trea-

ty to declare war on both offending countries, something he knew they could never do.

When war did come to Poland, however, the democracies showed the full extent of their hypocrisy by selectively declaring war on the Reich, but refrained from a similar declaration against the Soviet Union, whose troops crossed into Polish territory two weeks later. The prospect of England and France having to take on both Germany and Russia was too much for them. Although they did not refrain from declaring war on Germany, because they were honor-bound to have acted identically against the USSR, they did at least expose their seminal dishonesty before all history.

Of course, they never intended to come to Poland's rescue, a self-evident impossibility, in any case. The Poles fought bravely and tenaciously with all they had in the conviction that the British and French would live up to their sworn pledges, and invade Germany from the west. It was this strong faith in their distant allies that inspired Polish defense of the nation's capital, even after such resistance, however determined, had become as futile as it was tragic. The Western "democracies" betrayed the Poles, who they cynically regarded as nothing more than cannon-fodder for their anti-Nazi agendas. Their real attitude was expressed by Winston Churchill after the surrender of Poland, the country he publicly portrayed as "the heroic defender of right and goodness against the Nazi hordes". Bitter after the Poles' defeat, he contemptuously dismissed them as "stupid Pollacks, who didn't know how to fight". That was all the thanks they got for providing the war Churchill, et al, demanded and got from them.



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